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 Volume 9. Number2, June 2003
 2002 ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
 AUSTRALASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR LOGIC
 CO-SPONSORED BY THE ASSOCIATION FOR SYMBOLIC LOGIC
 Canberra, Australia, November 30-December 2, 2002
 The 2002 Annual Conference of the Australasian Association for Logic took place in
 Canberra, Australia on November 30-December 2, 2002. The program comprised a one
 hour invited talk and 18 contributed talks of 40 minutes length each. The visit of the invited
 speaker Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini from the University of Torino was made possible
 by the financial support of the other sponsor of the conference, the Computer Sciences Lab-
 oratory of the Australian National University. Participants of the conference came from
 five countries: the US, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. The last day of
 the conference was run in conjunction with the Australasian Workshop on Computational
 Logic. The aim of bringing the two meetings together for a day was to encourage communi-
 cation and cooperation between researchers who have different backgrounds but overlapping
 interests.
 Abstracts of the invited and contributed talks that were presented at the conference follow.
 Conference Organizer
 KATALIN BIMB6
 Abstract of invited talk
 * MARIANGIOLA DEZANI-CIANCAGLINI, Finitary logical semantics.
 Universita di Torino, Dipartimento di Informatica, Corso Svizzera 185, 10149 Torino, Italy.
 E-mail: dezaniQdi. unito. it.
 Stone dualities allow to describe special classes of topological spaces by means of (possibly
 finitary) partial orders. Typically, these partial orders are given by the topology, a basis for it,
 or a subbasis for it. The seminal result is the duality between the categories of Stone spaces
 and that of Boolean algebras (see [4]). Other very important examples are the descriptions
 of Scott domains as information systems [5] and the description of SFP domains as pre-locales
 [1]. Intersection types can be viewed also as a restriction of the domain theory in logical
 form, see [1], to the special case of modeling pure lambda calculus by means of co-algebraic
 complete lattices. Intersection types have been used as a powerful tool both for the analysis
 and the synthesis of A-models, see e.g., [2]. On the one hand, intersection type disciplines
 provide finitary inductive definitions of interpretation of A-terms in models. On the other
 hand, they are suggestive for the shape the domain model has to have in order to exhibit
 certain properties [3].
 [1] S. ABRAMSKY, Domain theory in logicalform, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, vol. 51
 (1991), pp. 1-77.
 ? 2003. Association for Symbolic Logic
 1079-8986/03/0902-0012/$$.90
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 [2] M. COPPO. M. DEZANI-CIANCAGLINI, F HONSELL and G. LONGO, Extended type struc-
 tures and filter lambda models, Logic colloquium '82, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1984,
 pp. 241-262.
 [3] M. DEZANI-CIANCAGLINI, F HONSELL, and Y. MOTOHAMA, Compositional characteri-
 zation of i-terms using intersection types, In Mathematical Foundations of Computer Science
 2000, vol. 1893 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, Berlin, 2000, pp. 304-313.
 [4] P. T. JOHNSTONE, Stone spaces, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
 [5] D. S. SCOTT, Domains for denotational semantics, In Ninth International Colloquium
 on Automata, Languages and Programming, vol. 140 of Lecture Notes in Computes Science,
 Springer, Berlin, 1982, pp. 577-613.
 Abstracts of contributed talks
 * KATALIN BIMBO, Equational dual and symmetric combinatory logics.
 Automated Reasoning Group, CSL, RSISE, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian Na-
 tional University, Bid. #115, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200, Australia.
 E-mail: bimboscsl. anu. edu. au.
 Dual combinators and symmetric A-calculus were introduced in [3] and in [1]. It is known
 that the equational logic based on analogues of a combinatorially complete set of combinators
 yield triviality in both cases. We define two classes of equational logics, one that includes
 identity combinators, another that lacks identities (as primitive or defined combinators).
 We also consider the result of adding a rule of extensionality to these logics. Although all
 of these logics are known not to have the diamond property, we prove that all of them are
 consistent.
 We give algebraic and set theoretical semantics for each of these logics. In the latter case,
 we provide both relational and operational semantics, and we analyze how they relate to
 each other. For all the logics soundness and completeness is proven with respect to the
 corresponding semantics.
 [1] F. BARBANERA and S. BERARDI, A symmetric lambda calculus for classical program
 extraction, Information and Computation, vol. 125 (1996), pp. 103-117.
 [2] H. B. CURRY and R. FEYS, Combinatory Logic, vol. I, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
 1958.
 [3] J. M. DUNN and R. K. MEYER, Combinators and structurally free logic, The Logic
 Journal oflGPL, vol. 4 (1997), pp. 505-537.
 * ROSS T. BRADY, Normalized natural deduction systems for some quantified relevant logics.
 Philosophy Program, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria 3086, Australia.
 E-mail: ross. bradyQlatrobe. edu. au.
 In the study of relevant logics, normalized natural deduction is the one area that has not
 been extensively studied. My paper [1] provided natural deduction systems for a wide range
 of (quantified) relevant logics, but they were not of the stylized form that normalization
 provides.
 The advantage of normalization is that one can prove a Subformula Property, which usually
 yields Decidability together with other results (conservative extensions, degree restrictions,
 etc.) that flow from the inductive character of the introduction and elimination rules for the
 connectives and quantifiers. For quantification, I will distinguish between constrained and
 unconstrained variables to expedite the inductive characterization.
 The normalization is an improvement on the one presented in Wellington last year and I
 cover the sentential relevant logic DW and its quantified extension DWQ.
 258
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 [1] R. T. BRADY, Natural deduction systems for some quantified relevant logics, Logique et
 Analyse, vol. 108 (1984), pp. 355-377.
 ? JOHN N. CROSSLEY, Structures with features and time.
 School of Computer Science and Software Engineering, Monash University, Clayton, Vic-
 toria 3800, Australia.
 E-mail: jncQmail. csse .monash. edu. au.
 What do we look at first when checking a proof? What is important in recognizing
 someone's face? What are the important things that make us realize we are looking at a
 (mathematical) graph? How do we look at a building? How do pilots navigate safely while
 using such complicated instrument panels?
 These are all examples involving structures with features. The concept seems to arise in very
 many different contexts but not to have been formalized until the author's earlier paper [1].
 This is true despite the use of Feature Set Theory by cognitive psychologists and Design
 Patterns by the architect Christopher Alexander in the mid-seventies and the Gang of Four
 object-oriented programmers in the 1990s.
 In [1] we used the above examples to suggest how features are important in the process
 of abstraction from known structures, and how and when formal descriptions correspond to
 the world. However, since people's faces alter over time, and, in general, structures interact
 with each other and thereby change, it is necessary to include some time parameter.
 In this paper we begin the development of a descriptive language which extends our earlier
 work to include some acknowledgement of time and its role.
 We consider the operations of modifying, adding and deleting features in a structure, and
 interactions between structures with features. In particular we look at the question of what
 it means for (classes of) structures with features to be equivalent and to what extent we can
 actually determine whether two given structures are equivalent.
 [1] J. N. CROSSLEY, Structures with features, manuscript, (available at http://www. csse.
 monash.edu.au/~jnc/features. {pdf,ps}.)
 ? GUIDO GOVERNATORI AND ANTONINO ROTOLO, De re modal semantics.
 School of ITEE, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, Queensland 4072, Australia.
 E-mail: guidoQitee. uq. edu. au.
 CIRSFID, University of Bologna, via Galliera 3, 40121, Italy.
 E-mail: rotolo{cirfid. unibo. it.
 Any quantified modal logic with the world-relative interpretation presents important ques-
 tions about the treatment of de re modalities when a term does not refer to an existing in-
 dividual. We provide a system of quantified modal logic that overcomes them. This result
 is achieved, semantically, with a dual quantification (one for terms not bound by modal
 operators, and one for terms not modally bound) and with the help of positive and negative
 extension (interpretation) of predicates.
 Kripke frames are extended with: a function d: W 1-+ 2D which assigns to each world
 its domain; V(q$, wi) C d(wi)n and A(,, wi) C Dn, respectively, the positive extension and
 the negative extension of a predicate q w.r.t. a given world; a set F of partial (ostension)
 functions f: W x e i- D. v and A satisfy the following conditions:
 1. If d E v(q,w ) then d -A(, wi);
 2. Vc: f(wi,c) = d E d(wi), if d vY(0,w)) then d E -A(, w).
 The idea behind negative and positive extension of a predicate q is that q is believed to be
 true until a counterexample is provided, i.e., until an element does not belong to the negative
 extension. Given a model M, the notion of a formula c being true in M at wi, |=M a contains
 the following clauses:
 259
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 1. KM q(c) iff (1) f(w, c) E d(w,) and f(w, c) E v(0, w), or
 (2) f(w,, c) t d(wi) and f(w,, c) A-\(, w,);
 2. J Vx(y(x)#DE(x)) iff VCh, k, w if wiRw/, f(wj,ch) C d(wj) and f(w/.c,) c
 f(wi, k), then wj 7(ck/x)#EB5(ch/x).
 In this way quantifiers establish the range of quantification with respect to a modality. Open
 and objective formulas are evaluated in the whole domain, whereas de re formulas take care
 only of the individuals in the valuation of actual world(s) domain(s).
 ? SVEN HARTMANN, Inference rules for participation constraints.
 Department of Information Systems and Information Science Research Centre, Massey
 University, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
 E-mail: s. hartmann,massey. ac. nz.
 Database constraints are used to express the properties that a database must respect to
 plausibly represent the underlying section of reality. Participation constraints are among the
 most popular constraint classes available in semantic database models as for example the
 higher-order entity relationship model [2]. They impose restrictions on the number of times
 objects of a certain type may participate in relationships of certain types.
 In our talk we discuss recent results on the implication problem for participation con-
 straints continuing earlier work in this area [1]. Special attention is devoted to generalized
 participation constraints limiting the occurrence of combinations of various objects.
 We present a sound and complete system of inference rules for the class of participation
 constraints and provide a characterization of closed constraint sets. Finally, we point out
 that implication and finite implication do not coincide for participation constraints.
 [1] S. HARTMANN, On the implication problem for cardinality constraints and functional
 dependencies, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 33 (2001), pp. 253-307.
 [2] B. THALHEIM, Foundations of entity-relationship modeling. Annals of Mathematics and
 Artificial Intelligence, vol. 6 (1992), pp. 197-256.
 ? LLOYD HUMBERSTONE, Beziau's paradox.
 Department of Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, Monash Uni-
 versity, P.O. Box 1 la, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia.
 E-mail: lloyd. humberstone~arts .monash. edu. au.
 Jean-Yves B&ziau in [1] has given an especially clear example of what he considers a
 phenomenon sufficiently puzzling to call the 'paradox of translation': the case of one logic
 being strictly weaker than another and yet such that the stronger logic can be embedded
 (faithfully) in it via a definitional translation. We elaborate on Beziau's example, which
 concerns classical negation, as well as give some additional background (especially from
 intuitionistic logic) to the example, and finally consider whether such examples should be
 found puzzling.
 [1] J.-Y. BIZIAU, Classical negation can be expressed by one of its halves, The Logic Journal
 of the IGPL, vol. 7 (1999), pp. 145-151.
 ? BARTELD KOOI, HANS VAN DITMARSCH AND WIEBE VAN DER HOEK, A de-
 scription language for dynamic epistemic actions.
 University of Groningen, Computing Science, P.O. Box 800, 9700 AV Groningen, The Nether-
 lands.
 E-mail: barteldOcs . rug. nl.
 Department of Computer Science, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, New Zealand.
 E-mail: hanscs . otago. ac. nz.
 In our paper we develop a dynamic epistemic logic that allows partial descriptions of
 actions. In most dynamic epistemic logics an entire description of an action is required, even
 260
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 when one is only interested in some features of the action. Let us first explain what dynamic
 epistemic logic is, and why such a logic is worthwhile.
 Epistemic logic is a modal logic used to reason about information. It deals with information
 of many agents, including information they have about each other. In this way epistemic
 logic also deals with higher order information. However, it does not deal with information
 change. Dynamic epistemic logics are extensions of epistemic logic that deal with information
 change. Several systems have been proposed, notably those by [2], [1], [5], and more recent
 work by [4] combining hybrid logic with multidimensional logic and epistemic logic, and [3]
 combining probabilistic logic with dynamic epistemic logic.
 In dynamic epistemic logic, incorporating information is called updating. It should not be
 confused with the notion of updating in the belief revision paradigm. The simplest example
 is where an agent learns that a sentence holds. But there are much more complicated forms,
 where different agents have different access to the information and the information the agents
 have about each other also plays a role.
 In our paper we define multi-agent static and action models and show how to execute
 an action model in a static model based on [1]. We define a static and an action language
 that can be interpreted in the static and action models, respectively. Moreover a dynamic
 language is introduced which is a mix of the static and action languages. A proof system that
 is as of yet incomplete is also provided. Some of the difficulties of devising a complete proof
 system are discussed.
 [1] A. BALTAG, L. S. Moss and S. SOLECKI, The logic of public announcements, common
 knowledge, and private suspicions, Technical report, SEN-R9922, CWI, Amsterdam, 1999.
 [2] J. GERBRANDY and W GROENEVELD, Reasoning about information change, Journal of
 Logic, Language, and Information, vol. 6 (1997), pp. 147-196.
 [3] B. P. KooI, Probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic, manuscript, 2002, (available at
 http: //www. cs. rug. nl/~barteld/.).
 [4] B. D. TEN CATE, Internalizing epistemic actions, In M. Martinez (ed.) Proceedings of
 the NASSLLI2002 student session, 2002, pp. 109-123.
 [5] H. P. VAN DITMARSCH, Knowledge Games, (ILLC Dissertation Series DS-2000-06),
 Amsterdam, 2000.
 * SEBASTIAN LINK, Capturing dependency classes in conceptual databases.
 Massey University, Department of Information Systems, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
 E-mail: s. linkSmassey. ac. nz.
 The theory of databases has widely been the theory of the relational database model. In
 this context, sound and complete sets of inference rules for the implication of functional and
 multivalued dependencies are well-known ([1], [2]).
 This paper investigates finite axiomatizability of functional and multivalued dependencies
 in the higher-order entity-relationship model introduced in [3].
 It is demonstrated that the set of subattributes of a given nested attribute carries the
 structure of a Heyting Algebra. Sound and complete sets of inference rules in Hilbert style
 are identified for the families of functional dependencies and both functional and multivalued
 dependencies, generalizing the results from [1] and [2], respectively.
 [1] W. W. ARMSTRONG, Dependency structures of data base relationships, Information Pro-
 cessing 74, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1974, pp. 580-583.
 [2] C. BEERI, R. FAGIN and J. H. HOWARD, Acomplete axiomatization for functional and
 multivalued dependencies in database relations, International Conference on Management of
 Data, ACM-SIGMOD, 1977, pp. 47-61.
 [3] B. THALHEIM, Foundations of entity-relationship modeling, Annals of Mathematics and
 Artificial Intelligence, vol. 6 (1992), pp. 197-256.
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 ? CASEY N. MCGINNIS, Some of the best worlds are impossible: semi-paraconsistent deontic
 logic and its motivation.
 Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Minneapolis, Minnesota
 55455, USA.
 E-mail: mcgin017Qumn. edu.
 A quandary is a situation in which a state of affairs is obligatory and forbidden. Classical de-
 ontic logic (CDL) cannot handle quandaries, as it validates the principle of deontic explosion,
 according to which if anything is obligatory and forbidden then everything is. Paraconsistent
 deontic logic (PDL) can handle quandaries, as it invalidates deontic explosion; however, it
 faces a serious drawback, namely, that it forces the rejection of disjunctive syllogism (or some
 even more intuitive logical principle). In this paper I introduce a "semi-paraconsistent" de-
 ontic logic (SPDL) which rejects deontic explosion, but preserves disjunctive syllogism (and
 indeed all of classical propositional logic), thus occupying a pleasing middle ground between
 CDL and PDL. Against the objection that SPDL is an ad hoc construction, I argue that it
 is a natural expression of some independently defensible assumptions about the notion of a
 "deontically perfect" world.
 ? ROBERT K. MEYER, Combinators, relevance and types-as-formulae.
 National ICT Australia, Automated Reasoning Group, RSISE, Bld. #115, Australian Na-
 tional University, Canberra, Australia.
 E-mail: bob meyer@anu. edu. au.
 By the Key to the Universe, we mean the satisfying correspondence between candidate
 axioms for relevant and other logics and combinators. Roughly, the axioms are the types
 assigned by Curry in [1] to these combinators in his illative Combinatory Logic (henceforth,
 CL). Magically, the postulates set down for such axioms in the relational semantics for
 substructural logics (e.g., in [2]) have the shape of the corresponding combinators. The
 formal ground of this magic was glimpsed in [3] and worked out (for the related A-calculus
 LC) in [4]-there are models of CL in logical theories. But the Key to the Universe needs
 sharpening. Viewed logically, the good model of [4] does without disjunction and negation.
 Yet relevant semantical soundness and completeness proofs accommodate these particles
 smoothly. By climbing a set-theoretic level-from sets of formulae (level 1) to sets of sets of
 formulae (level 2)-we show how to represent the combinators better in this work.
 [1] H. B. CURRY and R. FEYS, Combinatory Logic, vol. I, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
 1958.
 [2] R. ROUTLEY and R. K. MEYER, The semantics ofentailment III, Journal of Philosophical
 Logic, vol. 1 (1972), pp. 192-208.
 [3] R. K. MEYER, M. W. BUNDER and L. POWERS, Implementing the 'Fool's model' of
 combinatory logic, Journal of Automated Reasoning, vol. 7 (1991), pp. 597-630.
 [4] H. BARENDREGT, M. CoPPo and M. DEZANI-CIANCAGLINI, Afilter lambda model and the
 completeness of type assignment, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 48 (1983), pp. 931-940.
 ? CHRIS MORTENSEN AND PETER QUIGLEY, Cubic logic, Ulam games and paracon-
 sistency.
 Philosophy Department, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, South Australia 5005, Australia.
 E-mail: cmortens0arts. adelaide. edu. au.
 E-mail: peter. quigleyQstudent. adelaide. edu. au.
 Ulam Games are series of 20 questions in which one or more lies are permitted. Mundici
 showed that these can be decided using Lukasiewicz Logics, with the number of lies permitted
 determining the number of values of the Logic. It was also shown that Rota-Metropolis Cubic
 models are characteristic for the game with 1 lie. In the present paper two things are done:
 (1) the result is extended to the general case with more than 1 lie, and (2) Mundici's claim
 that paraconsistent negation is involved is analysed and shown to be correct in part.
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 [1] F CICALESE, D. MUNDICI and U. VACCARO, Rota-Metropolis cubic logic and Ulam-
 Renyi games, In D. Senato and H. Crapo (eds.) Algebraic combinatorics and computer science:
 a tribute to Gian-Carlo Rota, Springer-Italia, Milan, 2001, pp. 197-244.
 * GREG RESTALL, What shapes can proofs be?
 Philosophy Department, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria 3010, Australia.
 E-mail: restall@unimelb. edu. au.
 Natural deduction proof systems are elegant, powerful and, as the name says, natural.
 Different constraints on the structure and shape of proofs give rise to different logics. In this
 talk I will sketch some of the known results about different systems of natural deduction,
 present some original results, and indicate why they are interesting from both computational
 and philosophical perspectives.
 * SUSAN ROGERSON, Investigations into the properties of structural rules on the right.
 Department of Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Linguistics and Bioethics, Monash Uni-
 versity, P.O. Box 1 la, Clayton, Victoria 3800, Australia.
 E-mail: sufsurogerson. com.
 In his paper [1] Hirokawa shows that for a given sequent calculus formulation of first
 order classical logic, the structural rules of thinning on the right and contraction on the right
 cannot be separated; that is, any proof using n occurrences of one will also use n occurrences
 of the other. Hirokawa notes that his result is sensitive to the formulation. In this paper we
 investigate this sensitivity, both with respect to the formulations of the rules governing the
 connectives present and to the choice of the connectives themselves.
 [1] S. HIROKAWA, Right weakening and right contraction in LK, Proceedings ofCATS'96,
 (Computing: The Australasian Theory Symposium), Melbourne, Australia, January 29-30,
 RMIT, University of Melbourne, 1996, pp. 168-174.
 * KLAUS-DIETER SCHEWE, Error-robust functional dependencies.
 Massey University, Department of Information Systems and Information Science Research
 Centre, Private Bag 11 222, Palmerston North, New Zealand.
 E-mail: k. d. schewe@massey. ac. nz.
 A database user may be confronted with a relation that contains errors. These errors
 may result from transmission through a noisy channel, or they may have been added delib-
 erately in order to hide or spoil information. Error-robust functional dependencies provide
 dependencies that still hold in the case of errors. We investigate the finite axiomatisation of
 such dependencies, and present a sound and complete system of axioms and rules for the
 implication of error-robust dependencies.
 ? HARTLEY SLATER, A short lesson in logic.
 Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, 35 Stirling Highway, Crawley,
 Western Australia 6009, Australia.
 E-mail: slaterbhOcyllene. uwa. edu. au.
 I pointed out in [1] that the constant expression 'is heterological' masks the variable in 'is
 not self-applicable'. The latter predicate involves a reflexive pronoun, which is a constant
 syntactic item, but in different contexts it has a different referent. There is thus a problem
 with '"x" is h iff "x" is not x'. because it does not respect the feature which allows there
 to be no problem with '"x" is non-x iff "x" is not x'. The point clearly also applies to the
 variable set in Russell's Paradox. What is a set a member of iff it is not a member of itself?
 It is a member of its complement.
 What misleads is that in the lambda abstraction, and set abstraction expressions which
 are commonly taken to refer to properties and sets, all the variables are bound. But these
 263
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 abstracts are drawn from whole sentences, and it is only parts of those sentences which
 express the properties involved, and which relate, therefore, to any associated set. That a set
 is not a member of itself is not a property of it, but a truth about it, it must be remembered;
 and the property it then possesses is, in fact, not only context-sensitive, but also ambiguous,
 as I showed in [2]. What is missing in Fregean abstracts is, first of all, the indentification of
 a single, subject place where the variable is bound.
 Confusing predicates with sentences is also present in common treatments of the Liar
 and related paradoxes, along with confusing sentences with thoughts. Can it be said of
 the sentence 'The sentence at the top of the page is false', that it is false of anything-in
 particular, that it is false of itself, if it is the sentence at the top of the page? No: for there is
 no place waiting in that sentence for the name of any thing it might be false of to be inserted.
 That it is false is the sort of thing which might be false of something, because 'that it is false'
 has a space waiting to be filled in the appropriate way. But, as a result, for that it is false
 to be false of itself would be for it to be false of something unspecified, since its expression
 contains a waiting pronoun. In fact, that it is false is false of the said sentence (no matter
 where it might be), because sentences are neither true nor false. What might be true or false
 of s is that it is P, but 'that s is P' is not a sentence, it is a noun phrase-a demonstrative
 referring phrase to a thought, as I explained in [3]. If the sentence at the top of the page is a
 Strengthened Liar, like 'The sentence at the top of the page is false, or neither true nor false',
 wouldn't we, contradictorily, have to say that the sentence actually there was true, since it
 states the facts? No: because what is true is simply that the sentence at the top of the page is
 false or neither true nor false, not 'the sentence at the top of the page is false or neither true
 nor false'
 [1] B. H. SLATER, Is 'heterological' heterological?, Mind, vol. 327 (1973), pp. 439-440.
 [2] B. H. SLATER, Sensible self-containment, Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 34 (1984),
 pp. 163-164.
 [3] B. H. SLATER, Prior's analytic revised, Analysis, vol. 61 (2001), pp. 86-90.
 * NICHOLAS J. J. SMITH, Not quite all there. fuzzy mereology and fuzzy existence.
 Department of Philosophy and Centre for Logic, Language and Computation, Victoria
 University of Wellington, P.O. Box 600, Wellington, New Zealand.
 E-mail: nicholas. smithQvuw. ac .nz.
 Daveore Lewder (the fusion of David Lewis and Theodore Sider) argues that mereological
 composition can never be a vague matter, for if it were, then existence would sometimes be
 a vague matter too, and that's impossible. I accept that vague composition implies vague
 existence, but deny that either is impossible. In this paper I develop degree-theoretic versions
 of quantified modal logic and of mereology, and combine them in a framework which allows
 us to make clear sense of vague composition and vague existence, and the relationships
 between them.
 * MATTHEW SPINKS, On BCSK logic.
 Gippsland School of Computing and Information Technology, Monash University, Chur-
 chill, Victoria 3842, Australia.
 E-mail: mspinksQwww. gscit .monash. edu. au.
 For a quasivariety K over a language C with a constant term 1, the 1-assertional logic
 of K, in symbols S(K,1), is the consequence relation F-s(K,1) from sets of L-terms to C-terms
 determined by the following equivalence:
 r F-(K,I)0 iff {Y1: F r} K X $ 1.
 An implicative BCSK-algebra is an algebra (A; =, -+, 1) of type (2,2, 0), where for all
 a, b E A the operations =' and -+ are defined, respectively, by the following pair of conditional
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 equalities:
 1 ifa =b b if a =
 a = b := <b and a -4 b :=
 lb otherwise 1 otherwise.
 We denote by BCSK the variety generated by the class of all implicative BCSK-algebras.
 BCSK logic, in symbols BCS K, is the J-assertional logic of the variety BCSK.
 Let A := (A; IA) be a pointed set. The pointedfixedpoint discriminator on A is the function
 f: A3 -* A defined by:
 f(a,b,c) c ifa =b
 1 otherwise.
 The element 1 is called the discriminating element. A pointedfixedpoint discriminator variety
 is a variety V with a constant term 1 for which there is a subclass K of V and a ternary
 term f(x, y, z) of V such that: (i) for every A E K, the term f(x, y, z) realises the pointed
 fixedpoint discriminator on (A; IA) with discriminating element 1; and (ii) V = HSP(K).
 The pure pointedfixedpoint discriminator variety, in symbols FPDI, is the pointed fixedpoint
 discriminator variety generated by the class of all algebras A := (A; f, IA) of type (3, 0),
 where f is the pointed fixedpoint discriminator on (A; 1A) and IA is a nullary operation. The
 main result of the talk is the following:
 THEOREM 1. The deductive systems BCSIK and S(FPD1, 1) are equivalent.
 * KOJI TANAKA, The AGM theory and inconsistent belief change.
 Philosophy Department, Macquarie University, Sydney, New South Wales 2109, Australia.
 E-mail: koji. tanakaQmq. edu. au.
 The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of
 researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in
 the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively
 little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this
 paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a conceptual and logical framework for
 belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply to Grove's sphere system,
 a semantical representation of the AGM theory, logics that do not infer everything from
 contradictory premises, viz., paraconsistent logics. I use three paraconsistent logics and
 discuss three sphere systems that are based on them. I then examine the completeness of
 the postulates of the AGM theory with respect to the systems. At the end, I discuss some
 philosophical implications of the examination.
 265
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.19 on Thu, 17 Jan 2019 10:57:48 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
